Williams and Utilitarianism

In his critique of functionalism, Williams finds fault in the useful loading to upper limit emolument in that it undermines the integrity of moral agents and denies wad the rambles and relationships they inherently value. Famously kn take as his Integrity expostulation, this proposition is immediately very enticing in that it appeals to the idea of the invaluable and imperative nature of kind-heartedness and compassion, versus the cold, impartial hand of Utilitarianism. That is non to say, however, that Utilitarians have been dealt a hefty criticism from which they have no defense.While Williams may be correct in c any foring that abandoning commitments or devaluing personal relationships may be counterintuitive, a Utilitarian could plead that his construction of integrity is equ bothy counterintuitive in that it would require one to override their intrinsic search of egotism- preservation. Additionally, if we were to presuppose Williams correctness, a Utilitarian could argue that the only plausible implementation of much(prenominal) a guess would signify valuing these emotional engagements above ones own agency, a scenario even to a greater extent demanding and sacrificial of ones identity than the Utilitarian proposal.Williams directs this remonstrance specifically toward Act-Utilitarianism, a branch of Utilitarian view that deems the morally correct action as the one that produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest tally of mountain. He claims that such a surmisal is incompatible with the aspect of human happiness that is found in the commitment to personal projects and relationships Utilitarianism would do well then to acknowledge the evident fact that among the things that make people happy is non only making other people happy, but being taken up or involved in any of a vast range of projects. 1 While Utilitarians truly need lower erect projects comprised of relationships and commitments in order to validate their hi gher order projects, the lower order projects will always serve the concerns of the first order. In turn, Williams asserts that such a compromise of emotional engagements for maximum utility usurps ones sense of self-importance, consequently marring the distinction between ones commitment and ones identity ( ) that criterion would eliminate any desire at all which was not blankly and in the most straightforward sense egoistic.Thus we should be reduced to frankly egoistic first-order projects, and- for all essential purposes- the one second-order utilitarian project of maximally satisfying first-order projects. 2Abandoning original commitments for the sake of another project can be acceptable, but when forced to relinquish those which a person deeply values, Williams argues they be robbed of a sense of ones moral identity or what he describes as ones integrity.Williams offers us two scenarios to further exemplify his theory Jim, who is told by the edicts of utilitarianism to murder one innocent amazon Indian in order to prevent twenty more being murdered, and George, a chemist who is (to a fault by the parameters of Utilitarianism) forced to take a job creating weapons of mass destruction, since the balance-sheet of utilities shows that if George refuses, a far younger, more zealous chemist will carry the project along even further and more efficiently than George.While these scenarios may appear like far-fetched constructions meant to reveal Utilitarianism pursuing the wrong choice, Williams conversely (perhaps begrudgingly) admits that these would be the right choices for the given circumstances. The true problem, he argues, is 1? course credit? 112? 2? CITATION? 113? ? hat the emphasis should not simply be on the rightness of the action but the considerations involved in reaching that conclusion. This is a feature of Utilitarianism Williams claims cuts out a consideration which for some others makes a difference to what they feel about such cases. 3 H e continues to apologize that excluding such considerations denies our sense of personal accountability for our own actions and in turn makes integrity as a value more or less intelligible. In sum, if we were to reduce Williams entire integrity objection to its most salient points, they would be the following the emotional commitments that are incompatible with the parameters of Act- Utilitarianism are not only impossible to abandon altogether but are an integral facet of human happiness, so creating a dilemma for the Utilitarian in that they must allow for it. The potential defense of a Utilitarian to Williams objection begins with the examination of his construction of integrity, which he seems to define as ones sense of self.Looking simply at this definition alone, it could be said that subjectivity suggested with this variety of integrity incorrectly presupposes that a persons sense of their identity is always correct. Utilitarianism could make a claim for the value in assess ing reality with the sort of impartiality that Williams rejects, seeing as if one is not being appraised objectively, their sense of self is entirely contingent on their own conception.More importantly, and the crux of the Utilitarian defense, is that while Williams is correct in his claim that abandoning these emotional entanglements is counterintuitive, maintaining such commitments are at odds with the human desire for self-preservation, a 3? CITATION? p99? 4? CITATION? p99? ? conflict that Utilitarianism not only recognizes but Williams does not offer any executable solution for.Based on his examples and criticisms of Utilitarianism, it could be inferred that Williams assumes that we have a moral obligation to help others in a time of crisis, that one has an inherent responsibility to compassion and benevolence. This is clearly in conflict with the Utilitarian theory that ones responsibility is to maximum utility, so even if the Utilitarian were to concede to Williams objection , it would be unbelievable to imagine a scenario in which the two could be regarded as being of equal value.In turn, the only picking available to maintaining this ethos of selflessness would be to regard it as superior to maximum utility. This, a Utilitarian could argue, could bear witness to be extremely problematic. Firstly, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that people have the capacity to function entirely out of selflessness. Even though benevolence and emotional attachment can provide a certain level of happiness and fulfillment to a person, the expectation to unilaterally value the welfare of others over our own is not only implausible but ultimately self-defeating.Abandoning or betraying commitments in order to further invoke a larger more important agenda certainly isnt an idea particular to Utilitarianism. A quick browse of a history textbook would support that, by and large, humans are inherently self-serving and while one may commit to an act, cause or person, i t does not necessarily mean that they themselves arent using such relationships for their own agency. Utilitarianism may require that a person abandon a particular commitment for the sake of the reater good, but it can certainly be said that in the absence of utilitarianism, the commitment could be abandoned anyway, except in this case it would be for a self-serving purpose. A Utilitarian could potentially argue that their moral theory simply recognizes and curbs the inwardly focused desires of mankind and attempts to send such motivation toward the greater good. One could argue that Williams is somewhat disillusioned with mankind as he makes sweeping idealizations of the human psyche.Williams examples of Jim and George seem to both be contingent on the idea that what makes said examples flurry is premise that both men would be acting against their conscience, in turn making the assumption that all people have consciences that should be considered. Secondly, if one could clear th e hurdle of the first argument, the actual implementation of such a theory is extremely difficult. Williams argues that Utilitarianism is far too demanding to be plausible but in fact, trade this impartiality for benevolence proves to be far more exhausting.Considering the worlds current state of affairs, thither are always people in dire need of help, so one calls into question incisively what parameters would be set in place in order to orchestrate such a society. What would be the stipulations of a worthy recipient of anothers benevolence? If Williams was simply talking about peoples obligation to those close to them, valuing those relationships above maximum utility creates a bias that is even more incompatible with benevolence than Utilitarianism, which at least works in the interest of the entire population.A Utilitarian could also argue that it simply because they are outweighed by maximum utility does not mean that substantial relationships are not valued in Utilitarianism . While they are indeed lower order projects, a Utilitarian could make an argument that it is through maintaining such relationships that the value of ones own welfare is cognize and are only outweighed by serious interests of first order projects.The analyses above reflect the same conclusion. Williams objection brings to light shortcomings in Utilitarianism that are easily felt by those uncomfortable with the impartial and seemingly uncompassionate Utilitarian mentality. However, the arguments put forth by Williams regarding the counterintuitive and overly demanding nature of impartiality neglect the in like manner inherent and insatiable desire for self-preservation.